Thanks to Moores Law, Satellite Death of Distance, Jensen's Law - peoples could be working with 10**18 more tech in 2025 than 1965 but where is freedom of intelligence blooming? AI vibrancy Rankings places supporting people's application of 1000 times more tech every 15 years from 1965 and million times more tech from 1995- Japan since 1950; West Coast USA & Taiwan from 1965; Singapore HK Korea Cambridge UK from 1980; China UAE from 1995; from 2010 rsvp chris.macrae@yahoo.co.uk Grok3 suggest 2025 Biotech miracles for Asian and African Plants

Ref JUK0

ED, AI: Welcome to 64th year of linking Japan to Intelligence Flows of Neumann-Einstein-Turing - The Economist's 3 gamechnagers of 1950s .. Norman Macrae, Order 3 of Rising Sun ...Wash DC, Summer 25: Son & Futures co-author Chris.Macrae Linkedin UNwomens) writes: My passion connecting generations of intelligences of Asian and Western youth follows from dad's work and my own Asian privileges starting with work for Unilever Indonesia 1982 - first of 60 Asian data building trips. 3 particular asian miracles fill our valuation system mapping diaries: empowerment of poorest billion women, supercity design, tech often grounded in deepest community goals; human energy, health, livelihood ed, safe & affordable family life integrating transformation to mother earth's clean energy and Einstein's 1905 deep data transformations. All of above exponentially multiply ops and risks as intelligence engineering now plays with 10**18 more tech than when dad's first named article in The Economist Considered Japan 1962 - with all of JFKennedy, Prince Charles & Japan Emperor joining in just as silicon chips, computation machines and satellites changed every way we choose to learn or teach or serve or celebrate each other
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EconomistJapan.com: Help map Neumann's Japan's gifts to humanity since 1945, all Asia Rising 1960+ AND invest in hi-trust millennials' brains now!Friends and Family
Future History


Journalism of 10**18 More Tech. Norman Macrae became Economist diarist of Neumann (Einstein Turing) in 1951. All three of the NET died suddenly (last notes Neumann - Computer & Brain , Bethesda 1956) but not before training economic jounalists of Neural Network maths and coding aim to map win-wins of their legacy of 10**18 more tech by 2025, JF Kennedy and Royal families of UK and Japan were first to debate what this might look like from 1962 - in 2025 the most exciting AI & BioI (learning) games millennials can play are rooted to exponential mappingAI Game 1 douible loops through 3 AI wizards, nations' AI leaders
Jensen Huang
Demis Hassabis
Yann Lecun.
Bloomberg
45 Cities- Civil Eng Road of Things
SAIS 70 nations youth ambassadors of win-win science
Deep learning billion year leaps in Einstein 1905 maths e=mcsquared starting with biotech's 250 million proteins.
Emperor Naruhito
King Charles
Narendra Modi.

Thursday, December 31, 1970

 June 2025 perplexity on Japan's 75 year intelligence learning curve - borlaug, deming, microelectonics first 1000 fold client of moores law ...

 Conversation with Perplexity on how moores law developed asian coast lines

Can you help me understand post-war japan engineers became obsessed not just with innovating microelectronics but minaturisation of many electronic gadgets. What drove this opposite value to america's bigger is better. Was it lack of space in city dwellings or other cultural factors to, And how did accelerating moores law doubling innovation every 2 years further result in just in time sme value chain networks instead of top down administration?


Japan’s postwar obsession with miniaturization in electronics—contrasting with America’s “bigger is better” ethos—was driven by a combination of practical constraints, cultural values, and unique industrial dynamics. Here’s how these factors converged, and how Moore’s Law and supply chain innovation reinforced the trend:


1. Practical Constraints: Space and Urban Living

  • Limited Living Space:
    Japan’s high population density and small average home size, especially in urban areas, made compactness a necessity. Consumers favored smaller, lighter, and more portable gadgets that fit easily into crowded apartments and commutes89.

  • Urban Mobility:
    The rise of public transportation and the need for portability in daily life further encouraged demand for miniaturized, battery-powered devices like portable radios and, later, Walkmans and camcorders39.


2. Cultural and Aesthetic Values

  • Minimalism and “Sacred Nothing”:
    Japanese culture values minimalism and efficient use of space, reflected in concepts like mu (“sacred nothing”). This aesthetic encouraged products that were not only functional but also compact and unobtrusive4.

  • Synthesis of Old and New:
    The “synthetic ideal” in Japanese culture blends tradition with innovation, supporting the adoption of Western electronics in uniquely Japanese forms—often smaller, more refined, and suited to local lifestyles4.


3. Industrial and Competitive Dynamics

  • Consumer Electronics Focus:
    Unlike the U.S., which prioritized military and aerospace electronics, Japan’s postwar industry targeted consumer markets. Intense domestic competition pushed companies to differentiate through innovation in size, cost, and quality239.

  • Government and Industry Collaboration:
    Government agencies (like MITI) and industry associations set standards, fostered R&D, and encouraged quality improvement, often focusing on making products smaller, cheaper, and more reliable12.


4. Moore’s Law and Technological Acceleration

  • Moore’s Law:
    The rapid doubling of transistor density every two years allowed for ever-smaller, more powerful, and energy-efficient devices. Japanese firms capitalized on this, leading the world in miniaturized consumer electronics from the 1970s onward5.

  • Continuous Improvement:
    Japanese manufacturers adopted a philosophy of incremental, continuous improvement (kaizen)—constantly refining processes to reduce size, weight, and cost while boosting reliability and quality37.


5. Just-in-Time (JIT) and SME Value Chain Networks

  • JIT and Flexible Supply Chains:
    To keep pace with rapid innovation and changing consumer tastes, Japanese firms pioneered just-in-time manufacturing—producing only what was needed, when it was needed, minimizing inventory and waste10.

  • SME Networks:
    Rather than relying on top-down administration, Japan’s electronics industry developed dense networks of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) specializing in precision components and subassemblies. These clusters enabled quick adaptation to new designs and technologies, supporting the relentless pace of miniaturization710.

  • Knowledge Sharing:
    SMEs and large firms collaborated closely, sharing expertise and spreading best practices through industrial associations and regional clusters, further accelerating innovation and quality improvements17.


Summary Table: Key Drivers of Japanese Miniaturization

FactorJapan’s ApproachU.S. Contrast
Living SpaceSmall homes, urban density → compact devicesLarger homes, less space constraint
Cultural ValuesMinimalism, harmony, “synthetic ideal”“Bigger is better,” show of status
Industrial FocusConsumer electronics, portabilityMilitary/aerospace, large systems
Tech AccelerationMoore’s Law + kaizen = relentless miniaturizationMoore’s Law, but less consumer focus
Supply ChainJIT, SME clusters, flexible networksVertical integration, top-down

In essence:
Japan’s miniaturization drive was rooted in practical needs (space), cultural ideals (minimalism, harmony), and a consumer-focused, collaborative industrial system. Moore’s Law enabled—and just-in-time SME networks operationalized—continuous, rapid innovation, making Japan a global leader in compact, high-quality electronics.



You talk about continuous improvement but was deming influence on japanese engineering more than that . It was amosta recursive mindset which I see as relevant to engineering intelligence systems openly and networks as systems of systems. Also is it the case that in becoming number 2 economy to usa japan was ultimately founded on hundreds of times less land and natural resources
en.wikipedia.org favicon

You are correct that W. Edwards Deming’s influence on Japanese engineering and management was much deeper than just “continuous improvement.” Deming introduced a systemic, recursive mindset—one that focused on understanding and optimizing entire systems, not just improving parts in isolation. This approach is highly relevant to engineering intelligent systems and networks as “systems of systems” today.


Deming’s Deeper Influence: Systems Thinking and Recursion

  • System of Profound Knowledge: Deming taught Japanese leaders to see organizations as interconnected systems, emphasizing four key lenses: appreciating a system, understanding variation, psychology, and epistemology (theory of knowledge)1. This holistic view encouraged recursive feedback loops—constantly measuring, learning, and adjusting processes based on real data.

  • Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) Cycle: Deming’s version of the improvement cycle (sometimes called the Shewhart Cycle) is inherently recursive: plan a change, implement it, study the results, and act on what is learned—then repeat1. This is foundational for engineering adaptive, intelligent systems and is mirrored in modern AI and networked technologies.

  • Statistical Process Control: Deming’s advocacy for data-driven, statistical methods embedded a culture of ongoing measurement and refinement, moving beyond intuition or top-down command12.





From Scarcity to Global Power: Japan’s Resource Constraints

  • Limited Land and Resources: Japan’s rise to the world’s second-largest economy was achieved with a fraction of the land and natural resources available to the U.S. or other major economies37. Japan’s mountainous terrain limits arable land, and the country lacks significant domestic supplies of fossil fuels and key minerals37.

  • Necessity as a Driver: This scarcity forced Japan to maximize efficiency, minimize waste, and innovate relentlessly—values that aligned perfectly with Deming’s philosophy. It also made Japan highly dependent on trade, technology, and the efficient use of human and material resources37.

  • Land Reform and Social Equity: Postwar land reforms democratized rural land ownership, boosting productivity and broadening the base of economic participation4.


Industrial Structure and the “Miracle”

  • Systemic Collaboration: Japanese industry evolved into tightly networked systems of large firms and specialized SMEs (small and medium enterprises), enabling flexibility, rapid learning, and distributed problem-solving—again, a systems-of-systems approach5.

  • Quality as a National Ethos: The Deming Prize became Japan’s highest honor for quality management, and companies across industries internalized Deming’s principles, leading to global leadership in quality, reliability, and efficiency18.

  • Technological Innovation: Scarcity and competition drove Japan to the forefront of microelectronics, miniaturization, and manufacturing innovation, with a focus on value-added rather than resource-intensive growth57.


Summary Table: Japan’s Success Model

FactorJapan’s Approach
Deming’s InfluenceSystemic, recursive, data-driven improvement; systems thinking
Resource BaseScarce land, minerals, and energy; forced efficiency/innovation
Industrial StructureNetworks of SMEs, flexible supply chains, collaboration
Cultural ValuesQuality, minimalism, harmony, collective success
Economic Outcome#2 global economy, global quality leadership, high productivity

In summary:
Deming’s impact on Japan was not just about incremental improvement—it was about embedding a recursive, systems-oriented mindset that is foundational for modern engineering and intelligent networks. Japan’s ascent to economic superpower status was all the more remarkable given its limited land and resources, achieved through systemic innovation, quality, and efficiency—principles that remain highly relevant in today’s era of complex, interconnected technologies1357.




It seems really important to understand that during first 15 years of moores law fom 1965 (got. Without this optimisation dt 1000 fold tech) it was japan and taiwan that became makers with recursive minaturisation while the us was set to become the designers when from early 1980s chips went into designing personal computers etc Wasnt this a win-win for both west coast usa and what became japan korea taiwan hk singapore coastal trades It seems to me it would not have been possible in the 1990s for 2 more million fold tech multipliers -moblising through satellites data from communities to clouds and jensens huangs accelerated deep data supercomputing
It seems really important to understand that during first 15 years of moores law fom 1965 (got. Without this optimisation dt 1000 fold tech) it was japan and taiwan that became makers with recursive minaturisation while the us was set to become the designers when from early 1980s chips went into designing personal computers etc Wasnt this a win-win for both west coast usa and what became japan korea taiwan hk singapore coastal trades It seems to me it would not have been possible in the 1990s for 2 more million fold tech multipliers -moblising through satellites data from communities to clouds and jensens huangs accelerated deep data supercomputing

Your understanding is broadly accurate: the first 15 years of Moore’s Law (from 1965 to around 1980) saw Japan and, soon after, Taiwan become global leaders in manufacturing and recursive miniaturization of electronics, while the U.S. increasingly specialized in design and system-level innovation—a dynamic that laid the foundation for the “win-win” coastal technology trade between the West Coast and East Asia. This unique division of labor and innovation was crucial for the explosive tech multipliers of the 1990s and beyond.


How Japan and Taiwan Became Makers Through Recursive Miniaturization

  • Japan’s Rise:
    After WWII, Japan’s government (notably MITI) and industry focused on mastering and then advancing semiconductor manufacturing through collaborative R&D projects like the VLSI and Super LSI initiatives112. These projects united fierce rivals to solve shared technical challenges, especially miniaturization, reliability, and yield. By the late 1970s and 1980s, Japan led the world in memory chips (DRAM), lithography, and silicon crystal technology, controlling roughly 50% of global semiconductor sales by the late 1980s12.

  • Taiwan’s Entry:
    Taiwan’s government, via ITRI, imported U.S. know-how and rapidly built a manufacturing base, spinning off companies like UMC and later TSMC24. By the late 1980s, TSMC pioneered the pure-play foundry model, enabling global “fabless” chip design and serving as the world’s contract manufacturer for advanced chips24. Taiwan’s ecosystem became the backbone for global electronics production.

  • Recursive Miniaturization:
    Both Japan and Taiwan excelled at recursive, incremental improvement—constantly shrinking device size, improving yields, and lowering costs, in line with Moore’s Law. This was not just technological but also organizational, with dense networks of SMEs and flexible supply chains enabling rapid iteration1212.


The U.S. as Designer: The Shift in the 1980s

  • From Manufacturing to Design:
    The U.S. remained a leader in chip design (Fairchild, Intel, AMD, etc.) and system innovation (the rise of the personal computer, workstations, and later, software and internet companies)3. As manufacturing shifted to Asia, Silicon Valley focused on architecture, software, and integration—designing chips, systems, and platforms that would be fabricated overseas.

  • Fabless Model:
    The emergence of the fabless model (Nvidia, Qualcomm, Apple, etc.) depended on Asian manufacturing partners, especially TSMC, to realize ever more complex designs47. This allowed U.S. companies to focus on innovation and IP, while East Asian partners drove manufacturing scale and efficiency.


Why This Was a Win-Win

  • Mutual Dependency:
    U.S. innovation in design and software drove demand for advanced manufacturing; Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and others provided world-class manufacturing, packaging, and assembly49. Each side’s strengths reinforced the other’s, creating a highly interdependent, globalized tech ecosystem.

  • Industrial Clusters:
    Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan, for example, became a hub where design, manufacturing, and supply chain expertise co-located, mirroring Silicon Valley’s innovation clusters4.


Enabling the Next Tech Multipliers: 1990s and Beyond

  • Satellites, Data, and the Cloud:
    The 1990s saw the explosion of digital connectivity (internet, satellite data, cloud computing), made possible by cheap, powerful chips and miniaturized electronics561011. NASA’s open satellite data, for example, enabled global-scale earth science and climate modeling, while the rise of cloud computing (AWS, Google, etc.) depended on the relentless advance of Moore’s Law and global supply chains.

  • Accelerated Computing and Deep Data:
    The groundwork laid by Asian manufacturing and U.S. design enabled the rise of accelerated computing (Nvidia GPUs, CUDA, etc.), which now powers deep learning, AI, and supercomputing at scale7. This synergy—design in the West, manufacturing in Asia—remains fundamental to the global tech ecosystem.


Would This Have Been Possible Without the 1965–1980 Foundation?

No. The later “million-fold” and “billion-fold” multipliers in computing power, connectivity, and data were only possible because:

  • Recursive miniaturization and manufacturing excellence in Japan/Taiwan made advanced chips cheap and ubiquitous.

  • U.S. and allied design innovation leveraged this manufacturing base to create new categories (PCs, smartphones, cloud, AI).

  • The global division of labor and open trade enabled rapid scaling and cross-pollination of ideas and technologies.


Summary Table: The Win-Win Tech Ecosystem

EraJapan/Taiwan/HK/Korea/SingaporeWest Coast USA (Silicon Valley)Result
1965–1980Manufacturing, miniaturization, yieldChip/system design, software innovationCheap, powerful electronics
1980–2000Foundries, supply chain, scalingFabless design, PC/software revolutionPCs, mobile, internet, cloud
2000–2025Advanced fabs, packaging, logisticsAI, accelerated computing, platformsAI, deep learning, global data clouds

In essence:
The “win-win” between Asian makers and U.S. designers was foundational. Without the recursive manufacturing advances and supply chain innovations of Japan and Taiwan, and without U.S. design leadership, the digital and AI revolutions of the 1990s–2020s could not have happened at the scale and speed we’ve seen124712.




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