Celebrate Neumann's &Japan's gifts to humanity since 1945, all Asia Rising 1960+MacraeFriends and Family
Future July 2020..If you care about two out of 3 lives mattering who are Asian, nearly 60 years of miracles mapping around worldwide decision-makers considering Japan from 1962 are worth replaying -that's when my father Norman Macrae aged 39 was privileged to write his first signed survey in The Economist -the first 2 quarters of dad's 80+ years of life had been spent
**writing unsigned leaders in The Economist (eg as only journalist at Messina's birth of EU) after serving as teenager in world war 2 navigating air places uk bomber command region modern day bangladesh/myanmar -

Asia Rising Surveys

in 60 years

Tuesday, December 31, 2030

welcome to consider japan 1962-2025- Tokyo has been our supercity benchmark since Economist and JFK Dialogues 1962- good to see ai grid update march 2024 during Nvidia GTC summit

pretraining vision ops for 2025 Osaka track meets king Charles AI World Series, Nvidia Digital Twins & More - related Japan Intel superstars - Naomi Osaka; Mayor Koike ....

Von neumann asked dad Norman to train journalists in survey - what good will peoples unite where they are lucky enough to be first to co-pilot at least 100 time more tech per dccade

By 1962 father had identified asia pacific as celebrating 2 spaces of 100 times more

-silicon valley (known for 100 times more due to moores law 1965 on exponential computation capacity of silicon chips)

what we might call the silicon coastal belt: japan south to korea peninsular taiwan, and soon hK and singapore

- these 2 innovation treasure troves for human development complemented the three the NET mainly lived ans saved word from namely

Switzerland (and neighbors) epicentre of telecoms  (ITU since 1865)and electricity worldwide coop standards

Princeton up NE Coast via UN and Courant NY, IBM, Yale to Boston (MIT), some include Dartmouth coherence

Princeton S by SW mainly gov (a)i of space and nuclear


EW: Whats Exciting fir 21st C is that 17 years after Jobs and Gates invented personal computing world 1984 they asked Fazle Abed envoy for poorest 1 billion girls intelligence to share his 65th birthday wish party spring 2001; this was at a time when the continued multipliers of moores law and itu's leaps 2F to 3G to $G to 5G meant possibilities of experimenting with 10000 times more tech per decade

lets map back from 2025 report networks potentially advancing humanity with this 

BY 2004 Jobs & Yang family had connected Abed's new university partnership wished with stanford the core ecosystem- multiple branches below; meanwhile gates family focused on partnership of global health foundations around abed and including jim kim and antonio guterres and larry brilliant

yahoo professorship starteed around 100 time more expert horowitz, who also launches ai100 2016 and joins CondyRice, Fei-Fei Li and 10 lead tech experts to celebrate hoover emerging tech review

by 2007 Yang & his Japanese wife  transfering most of their life's investments to stanford: building 07, encouraging eg Koller & Ng to headhunt Fei-Fei Li and start coursera, by circa 2022 Yang chairs Stanford trustees; his wife is on Doerr climate school trustee board with mrs jobs; taiwanese americans linking futures include nvidia's huang, the Tsai family, the maurice chang networks (see celebrations 2022-24 ny asia society)- also inside taiwan see technology minister Ms Tang

Li arrives stanford 2009; Hassabis is touring from london sponsored by Gatsby neurosciece; other biotech genii as well as koller are dowdna about to win nobel chemistry prize for gene database; later womens biotech further multiplied by Priscilla Chan

2012 LI leads the famous 5 breakthrough of ai winter to summer- where her 3rd annual global competition with biggest open databank the 20 million imagenet connects with the last 3 professors of neural networking algorithms to celebrate deep learning- this wakes up every tech & humanity investir to LI , Hassabis and the 3 famed Profs Lecun, Hinton & Bengio

Here are some fei-fei li multuplier networks that stanford encourages:

from 2014(7) ngo ed platform ai-4-all lead sponsored by nvidia ceo huang and melinda gates

from 2015- if UN sdgs are to be real, melinda gates and li blueprint how Un2.0 will need total transformation of education for all ages (called digital cooperation youth, digital capacity building elders) and AIgood launched at UN ITU from 2017- melinda gates completes the un2,0 roadmapping with 9 subsystems 5 are new dc under 30s dc over 30s aigood universal connectivity turing deep data codes - 4 will innovate the UN origin subsystems equality, rights, safety/trust, public goods  (abe's g20 deepens codes aka Osaka Track and vision socety5.0 which clusters sdgs and gov2.0 by contexts

 Whilst LI had from 2006 obtained some national science funding from 2018 her ai4all testimonies at congress start what is now at least 20 nations NAIRRS (policy advisory committees on being an AI nation and ensuring society's deepest data is owned for all the peoples- specifically li mentions how fast comp resources are being mobilised and the risk that media-chat will take over from ai advancing intelligence of all; li has been seconded to google cloud and can see ho digital corporations with 30 bn $ RI&D budgets are dwarfing even the whole of usa nation's gpu investment

2019 li returns to stanfird to launch HAI challenging every descipline to become 2.0 ai literate

hassabis gaming approach to generative computer visioning becomes popular after li's 2012 breakthrough; google brain and deep mind merge around it; by 2022 alphafold2 has open sourced natures 250 million protein's deepest ever game changer to biotech and indeed all natural science ai

2023 king charles starts turing ai world series (bengio is asked to be overall narrator) official stopovers 2024 korea april , paris post olympics; hoped for stopover worldbank liveable planet ai; sept UNsummit future NY; 2025 opportunities include 6 months osaka track

ED --L-UNwomens: sept 2023: upd after unga #beyondextinction 0  intelligence world's leading panels - CA .


  1. thank you abe, from csis economist goodman - Assessing Abe’s Economic Statecraft

    Read Online
    By Matthew P. Goodman

    Just days after setting the record for longest consecutive term as Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe announced on August 28 that he was resigning on grounds of poor health. Beyond its durability, Abe’s term may be remembered mainly for its disappointments: his failure to pull the Japanese economy out of its decades-long torpor, to achieve his dream of amending Japan’s constitution, to resolve tensions with neighbors in Northeast Asia. But in one area Abe deserves better marks from historians: his economic statecraft in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

    Abe came back into office in late 2012 determined to avoid the mistakes of his first, aborted term as prime minister in 2006-2007. In that earlier stint, Abe had shown virtually no interest in economics, putting his own constitutional-reform ambitions over the bread-and-butter concerns of most Japanese citizens. Abe 2.0 would not make the same mistake, announcing a three-point economic revitalization plan dubbed “Abenomics” by Japanese commentators.

    Abenomics was well conceived but unevenly implemented. It consisted of “three arrows” aimed at prodding Japanese growth and productivity: aggressive monetary easing, accommodative fiscal policy, and structural reform. Abe did well on the first arrow, appointing a new governor of the Bank of Japan, Haruhiko Kuroda, who made clear he would keep the monetary taps open until deflation was defeated. The fiscal policy record was more mixed, as repeated stimulus packages were undermined by two poorly handled consumption tax hikes. Most disappointing was the third arrow, as many of Abe’s promising structural reform initiatives, from “womenomics” to corporate governance reform, got bogged down by entrenched interests. part 2...continued

  2. To be fair, Abe’s domestic economic program faced massive headwinds caused by Japan’s daunting “3D” challenges: deflation, debt, and—most intractable of all—demographics. With the country’s aging population set to drop from 128 million at its peak in 2010 to 87 million by 2060, it would take a miracle of enhanced productivity for Japan to generate more than mediocre growth.

    But even with a weak hand at home, Abe understood that Japan’s economic weight as the world’s third-largest economy and a commercial powerhouse in the Asia-Pacific region gave him a trump card in foreign policy. And over his eight years in office, Abe played the economic statecraft card well. He used it to advance two enduring and interrelated goals of Japanese foreign policy: keeping the United States engaged in the Asia-Pacific region and managing the risks of a rising China.

    One of the first things Abe did upon returning to office was to lean into the Obama administration’s “rebalancing” strategy toward Asia. In early 2013, he traveled to Washington and declared in a seminal speech (at CSIS) that “Japan is back.” He made clear his interest in Japan’s joining the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations then underway. Despite the stiff resistance he expected from Japanese farmers and other vested interests at home, Abe saw TPP membership as a multifaceted strategic ploy to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, keep the United States embedded in the region, deepen ties with Japan’s Southeast Asian partners, and—not least—send a message to Beijing about Tokyo’s throw weight in regional rulemaking and norm-setting.

    continued part 3

  3. The election of Donald Trump halfway into his term forced Abe to sharply shift tactics while attempting to preserve the basic goals of his strategy. He quickly tried to ingratiate himself with Trump (famously flying to New York just weeks after the November 2016 election bearing a gift of a golden golf driver) in an effort to deflect the bilateral trade pressure that Abe knew was coming. While not entirely successful in these efforts, and paying a heavy price for what domestic critics saw as slavish behavior, Abe managed to avoid the worst of Trump’s tariffs on allies—most significant, threatened duties against the crown jewels of Japanese industry, automobiles.

    Trump’s decision to withdraw from TPP on his third day in office was a major inflection point for Abe. Where other Japanese prime ministers would likely have resigned themselves to collapse of the regional trade initiative without its principal sponsor at the table, Abe made one of his boldest moves: he took up the chairman’s gavel and persuaded the other 10 TPP members to carry on with the negotiations. Historians are likely to point to Abe’s stewardship of those talks to a successful conclusion—salvaging most of TPP in an eventual Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)—as one of the singular achievements of his term.

    Again, part of Abe’s strategic calculation about CPTPP was that it would plant a stake in the ground in the intensifying competition between Japan and China for regional leadership. As I have written elsewhere, while geographic proximity and commercial interdependence necessitate that Tokyo engage constructively with its large neighbor to the west, no Japanese leader can accept a Sinocentric order in the Asia-Pacific based on Beijing’s preferred rules and norms. Abe thus focused much of his economic statecraft on trying to offer alternatives to partners in the region.
    continued part 4


  4. In addition to CPTPP, other noteworthy efforts in this regard included his campaign to promote “quality infrastructure.” Launched in 2015 as a thinly veiled response to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Abe’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure initially offered regional partners $110 billion (a number suspiciously close to the initial $100 billion capitalization of Beijing’s Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank) of Japanese investment in railways and ports with high standards of transparency and social, environmental, and fiscal sustainability. Abe then used his 2019 chairmanship of the Group of 20 (G20) to get his fellow economic leaders—including President Xi Jinping of China—to endorse a set of six “Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment.”

    Data governance was another area in which Abe tried to make a statement about Japan’s preferred rules and norms. Often described as the “new oil,” data flow throughout the modern economy, yet there are few internationally agreed rules to govern the collection, storage, transfer, or privacy of data. Europe and China are staking out their own preferences in this area, but neither approach rests comfortably with Japan. Again, Abe used his role as host of the G20 in 2019 to win agreement to his concept of “data free flow with trust,” with the aim of starting a global conversation on this topic—along Japan’s preferred lines.

    Toward the end of his term, Abe worked more quietly to sharpen Japan’s domestic tools of "economic security." He won passage of legislation to tighten the country’s foreign investment screening mechanism, authorized stronger enforcement of export controls, and set up a new economics office in his National Security Secretariat. Most recently, Abe’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been considering proposals to strengthen intelligence agencies’ tools against commercial espionage.

    Balance—between offensive and defensive tools, between soliciting Washington’s favor and protecting Japan’s commercial interests, between engaging with and hedging against China—has been the hallmark of Shinzo Abe’s economic statecraft. His successor would do well to carry on this important dimension of the outgoing prime minister’s legacy.

    Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics and holds the Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.